Zero Tolerance ≠ Automatic Suspension for Any Violation of Safety Policy

Employers have very significant duties with respect to protecting the health and safety of their employees, and the potential liability to the employer in the case of an injury or fatality can be overwhelming.  As a result, many employers have adopted 'zero tolerance' policies to ensure that employees work in a safe manner.  But what does 'zero tolerance' really mean, and how enforceable are such policies?

In a recent arbitration decision, Arbitrator Paul Craven had the opportunity to comment on these concepts.  In U.S. Steel - Hamilton v. United Steelworkers, Local 1005, the grievor was by all accounts a good employee with a clean disciplinary record.  As he was leaving the plant one day, he was selected for a random vehicle search.  Plant security found a partial bottle of vodka in the trunk of the car, beneath some camping equipment.  The Company had a 'zero tolerance' policy that prohibited the possession of alcohol on company property, and provided for a 3-day suspension for a first violation.  The employee explained to the employer that he was driving his wife's vehicle that day, and that his daughter had previously used the car for a camping trip, and failed to unload the trunk.  A phone call to his daughter, in the presence of security staff, confirmed this to be the case, and the employer did not disbelieve this explanation. However, relying on the policy, the employee was still given a 3-day suspension, which he grieved.

At arbitration, the parties agreed that the Hamilton steel plant was a "safety-sensitive" environment and that alcohol and drugs should be kept out of the workplace, but the union argued that an unintentional violation of the policy which had no impact for plant safety should not have attracted such a serious form of discipline (the last step in the disciplinary process short of termination). The employer argued that strict and consistent enforcement of the policy was necessary to ensure that employees did not become confused about the rules against alcohol in the workplace.

Arbitrator Craven began his analysis by reviewing the decision in Re Lumber & Sawmill Workers’ Union, Local 2537, and KVP Co. Ltd. ("KVP"), which describes the test to be applied in assessing employer policies that have not been negotiated with and agreed upon by the union.

1. It must not be inconsistent with the collective agreement.
2. It must not be unreasonable.
3. It must be clear and unequivocal.
4. It must be brought to the attention of the employee affected before the company can act on it.
5. The employee concerned must have been notified that a breach of such rule could result in his discharge if the rule is used as a foundation for discharge.
6. Such rule should have been consistently enforced by the company from the time it was introduced.

Looking solely at the policy, and the company's evidence that it had been consistently enforced (with only one or two anomalous situations), the Arbitrator was of the view that the policy was generally reasonable and that the employer was entitled to rely on it to impose some form of discipline.  However, the Arbitrator then went on to consider whether the level of discipline imposed was appropriate considering the nature of the employee's policy violation.  Arbitrator Craven observed that if 'zero tolerance' means not only discipline for every violation, but the "automatic application of ... a significant penalty" (such as a one-week suspension) in every case, without this being part of the written policy, then the policy would fail the reasonableness test on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th prongs of the KVP test.  In short, if specific violations are to be subject to automatic penalties, those must be set out in the policy itself and brought to employees' attention.  Arbitrator Craven went on to state that 'zero tolerance' in the sense of a set penalty for any violation of the policy has also been held to violate the just cause provisions of a collective agreement (by not considering individual circumstances and by imposing discipline that is not "progressive"), and therefore would fail the test in KVP for that reason.

In looking at how the employer applied the policy to the grievor, the Arbitrator found that the punishment did not fit the crime. The employer had mechanically applied a set penalty without first considering the employee's disciplinary record and his blamelessness in unwittingly violating the policy.  The three-day suspension was found to be too severe, and was to be removed and replaced with a written warning.

The message to unionized employers should be clear.  In the absence of an agreed-upon specific penalty clause in the collective agreement, the employer should not impose automatic disciplinary sanctions for policy violations, even where there is a legitimate and pressing reason for insisting on 'zero tolerance'.  Zero tolerance should only be applied at the stage of determining whether there has been a violation of policy (i.e., an investigation should occur, and measures taken to address every violation).  Once a policy violation is found, the employer must assess the seriousness of the violation, considering the actual or potential harm to the organization, the presence or absence of intent, the employee's disciplinary record, the level of discipline previously applied for similar violations, etc.  Only by performing this analysis before taking corrective action can an employer later justify its actions.

Do you have questions about instituting new policies or the imposition of discipline?  Contact Lance Ceaser for expert advice.





 

 

 

 

 

Employer Condones 'Wilful Misconduct' by Failing to Take Effective Action

Under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (the "ESA"), employees generally have an entitlement to notice of termination or payment in lieu of notice, unless they fall into one of a handful of exemptions.  One of the exceptions provided under the Regulations to the ESA covers "[a]n employee who has been guilty of wilful misconduct, disobedience or wilful neglect of duty that is not trivial and has not been condoned by the employer."  Because the ESA provides a statutory minimum entitlement, adjudicators apply the exemption from termination notice or pay very strictly.  Employers will often focus on the seriousness of the offence, and struggle to establish the "intent" (i.e., the wilfulness) necessary to bring a "just cause" dismissal within the exemption.

However, as the recent decision in Cancore Building Services Ltd v. Merlos illustrates, employers also need to be aware of the dangers of having condoned an employee's bad behaviour.  In Cancore, the claimant was the supervisor of a window washing crew employed by the janitorial company.  He started with Cancore in 1989, and was promoted to a supervisory position after years of good performance.  However, as early as 1999 or 2000, the company began to have concerns about the claimant's performance as a supervisor, including misstating the hours that his crew worked on time sheets that he submitted.  He was cautioned about this issue at the time, and received repeated notes and warnings from the company regarding deficiencies in his supervision of staff, his work attitude, and his lack of responsiveness to pages.  In 2009, the employer again advised him to only record actual hours worked by his crew on time sheets, and that "padding" time sheets amounted to theft from the company.  Even more openly critical letters were written and given to the claimant in 2009 and 2010, which again highlighted the inaccurate reporting of employee working hours. The 2010 letter to the claimant purported to be a 'final warning' that he had to improve in all areas, but only three (3) weeks later, the employer issued yet another warning about improperly completed time sheets.  No disciplinary measures were ever taken to address his shortcomings.

In July 2012, a student employed on the claimant's crew told the company that he had been paid 8-hours' pay on a day when he did not work 8 hours.  Rather than investigate, by reviewing the time sheet in question or asking the claimant about the allegation, the employer summarily dismissed the supervisor.  In the termination letter, the employer accused the claimant of "time theft", among a number of other things, and stated that his behaviour constituted "willful misconduct" and cause for termination.  The employee filed a claim with the Employment Standards Branch, and an Employment Standards Officer found that he was entitled to termination pay.  The employer sought review of the Order to Pay at the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The Board started by observing that where an employer tries to rely on an exemption from an entitlement under the ESA, the employer bears the onus of proving that the exemption applies.  The Board found that the employer tried over a period of several years to improve the claimant's performance as a supervisor by "writing him letter after letter on the finer points of supervision", warning him about 'padding' time sheets.  While time theft of the nature alleged was "presumptively" wilful misconduct under the ESA, in the opinion of the Board, the employer did not have any evidence that the claimant had intentionally attempted to obtain wages for himself or his crew for work that they had not performed.  When an opportunity arose for the employer to establish that this was in fact the case, when the student came forward, the employer failed to investigate and just assumed that the allegation was true.  Moreover, despite numerous warnings over a period spanning about 12 years, the employer never imposed any sanctions on the employee.  In the words of the Board:  "That, quite simply, is condonation within the meaning of the Act."  In the result, the application for review was dismissed and the Order to Pay termination pay was upheld.

The decision in Cancore is illustrative of a number of principles and best practices that employers need to embrace.

• Managers need to be prepared to have difficult conversations with employees, about their performance, but they also have to be equipped to take meaningful action to address shortcomings and misbehaviour.  A written 'scolding' on a periodic basis, if not backed with progressively harsher forms of corrective action, will not suffice.
• Whenever feasible, investigate concerns about employees when they first arise.  Often where there's smoke there's fire, and it's best to stamp it out before it  becomes a blaze.  Remind senior management that putting in time and effort now could save a lot of aggravation and money down the road.  The longer the employee is allowed to stick around, the greater the risk that it will amount to condonation and the larger his/her entitlement to termination pay (and severance pay, if it applies to the employer).
• Enact policies and procedures to address the areas of concern.  Ensure that the policy is written in plain language and clear on what is permitted and what is not.  Educate employees on the content of the policy, and that there will be consequences for breaking the rules.
• Consider whether your existing policies and employment contracts provide the ability to impose disciplinary sanctions on employees, such as suspensions of varying lengths.  If the employer does not have the authority to suspend, doing so could amount to constructive dismissal.  If in doubt, speak to a labour & employment lawyer for guidance.
• If you find out that an employee has been engaged in a practice that is contrary to policy for an extended period of time without being addressed, set the stage to confront the issue going forward.  Bring the issue to the employee's attention, including the fact that the employer is aware of past violations, and put the employee on notice that the behaviour will be subject to discipline if repeated.  Follow-up and document any repetitions. (Check out the decision in Leon's Furniture Limited for an example of how an employer successfully addressed a pattern of bad behaviour that had persisted for some time.)

Employers need to be aware that their actions (or inaction) can be the biggest impediment to removing unsatisfactory employees.  By ensuring that dismissals for "just cause" also consider the more stringent requirements under the ESA (i.e., serious, intentional misconduct or neglect that has not been tolerated ), employers can avoid issues under the Act as well as at common law.

Do you have questions about the difference between "just cause" and "wilful misconduct"?  Need advice or guidance on an issue related to dismissal?  Contact Lance Ceaser for expert assistance.

 

 

ESA Complaint Found to Not Preclude Human Rights Application

While the Human Rights Code does provide a mechanism to prevent the relitigation of claims that may arise under a collective agreement or another statutory regime, it will not apply in all cases to prevent a claimant from making an Application to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the "Tribunal" or the "HRTO") based on the same or related circumstances.  Section 45.1 of the Code provides:

The Tribunal may dismiss an application, in whole or in part, in accordance with its rules if the Tribunal is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.

The Tribunal's focus in these cases is on determining whether the other proceeding "has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application".  Mere overlap between the factual allegations will not suffice, unless the other matter has resolved the human rights aspects of the claim.

Recently, the Tribunal found that a claim of family status discrimination was not precluded by the employee having made a prior claim under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (the "ESA").  In Bala v. TRQSS, Inc., the employee had advised her employer in January of 2013 that she anticipated having child care issues as her mother was becoming increasingly ill.  Although there was some discussion between employee and employer about the potential for trading shifts with other employees, it does not appear that any arrangements were put in place before the employee went on medical leave from mid-March until the end of April of 2013.  When the employee was supposed to return, she claimed one day of emergency leave to deal with child care, and was then absent for two more days.  The company advised the employee that she needed to attend work the following week or she would be deemed to have abandoned her position.  When she did not come to work for the first three days of the following week she was deemed to have resigned and her employment ended.

The employee made a claim to the Ministry of Labour for termination and severance pay under the ESA, but an Employment Standards Officer ("ESO") denied the claim, finding instead that the employee was disentitled as she had engaged in wilful neglect of duty.  She did not appeal the decision of the ESO to the Ontario Labour Relations Board.  The employee then brought an Application before the HRTO, alleging that she had been discriminated against on the basis of family status.  The employer asked the Tribunal to dismiss the application on the basis that it raised the same factual matters that had been addressed in the ESO's decision.

Following a summary hearing, the Tribunal rejected the employer's request to dismiss the Application.  The Tribunal noted that the remedial provisions of the ESA were not as robust as those found in the Code (at least in relation to orders to pay termination and severance pay), and that the ESO's decision did not reference the Code, the employer's duty to accommodate, whether the attendance policy was discriminatory, or any of the human rights issues that were raised by the Application.  Accordingly, it could not be said that the ESA claim had dealt "appropriately" with the "substance" (i.e., the human rights issues) of the employee's Application, and the matter should be allowed to proceed before the Tribunal.

While the Bala decision is fairly straight-forward on its face, it highlights an issue that employers should address when faced with a "proceeding" by an employee or former employee that may involve human rights issues, but which is not brought through the HRTO process.  Employers should ensure that any human rights claims are fully addressed in the initial proceeding, and dealt with effectively.  If the matter is resolved in a mutually acceptable manner, any settlement documentation should clearly address the fact that the human rights issues have also been fully and finally resolved.  Outside of these situations, arguing that a subsequent HRTO Application should be dismissed will be all but futile, and only serve to delay and drive up the costs of the litigation.

Do you have questions about procedure before the HRTO?  Wonder about the impact of various dispute resolution schemes on a claim?  Contact Lance Ceaser for advice and guidance.

 

Employer's Knowledge of Disability Not Necessary to Establish Duty to Accommodate Disabled Employee - Or is it?

While the law tends to move incrementally, one decision at a time, slowly establishing "precedents" that later decisions will follow, the outcomes in some cases do not always appear to be consistent.  Not infrequently, a decision may appear to be an outlier, at least until one delves deeper to understand the basis on which the result differs from previous cases. 

In a post on this blog in August (here), I noted that an employer generally does not have an obligation to accommodate an employee until such time as the employee comes forward with a condition that requires accommodation.  In both Bish v. Elk Valley Coal Corporation and Huffman v. Mitchell Plastics, employers were not held responsible for failing to accommodate employees who failed to disclose their "disability". However, it should be noted that in both decisions, the underlying condition related to substance abuse.

In a recent decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, however, the Court found that an employer's knowledge of the employee's disability was not an essential element of establishing whether there was prima facie discrimination.  In Telecommunications Workers Union v Telus Communications Inc., the employee was employed as a representative in a call centre operated by Telus.  He was a member of a bargaining unit represented by the TWU.  At the time of hiring, the employee had completed a Diversity Form, indicating "yes" to the question of whether he was a "person with a disability".  At no time, however, did Telus follow up with the employee to learn the nature of his condition or whether he required any form of accommodation. The employee was ultimately hired, but began displaying performance issues within the probationary period. On the evidence presented at grievance arbitration, it appears that the employee may have told his supervisors that the performance issues were related to his "condition", but it was not clear whether he expressly mentioned having Asperger's Syndrome.  The grievor was terminated, and the Union took his discharge to arbitration.

At labour arbitration, the Arbitrator determined that the employee did have a disability and that the issues with his performance which resulted in his termination were connected to that disability.  However, the Arbitrator also found that the employee had not provided sufficient information to the employer to trigger the duty to accommodate (or even to compel the employer to look further into his condition), and that the position in question could not be modified in a way that would permit the grievor to meet the requirements of the job.  The Union sought judicial review, but the Arbitrator's decision was upheld by a judge of the Court of Queen's Bench.

On appeal, the Union argued that the Arbitrator and the lower court had both misapplied the test for prima facie discrimination, and had failed to properly consider the test for establishing a bona fide occupational requirement.  The Court of Appeal reviewed the test for a finding of adverse effect discrimination, and found that the employer's knowledge was not a necessary element of that test.  Provided there was a negative consequence for the claimant from an apparently neutral rule, and the employee's disability contributed to that adverse outcome, the claimant has made out adverse effect (or indirect) discrimination.  In the case at bar, the employee's disability was a contributing factor in his inability to meet the employer's performance standards, which led to his discharge, so he had clearly made out a case. 

However, the Court then went on to consider the test for demonstrating a bona fide occupational requirement as set out in PublicService Employee Relations Commission v British Columbia Government and ServiceEmployees’ Union (often cited as “Meiorin”), and found that the employer could not have accommodated the employee in his current or any other position, given the effects of his disability.  Accordingly, although the Court disagreed with the Arbitrator's finding that there was no prima facie discrimination, the Court upheld the ultimate decision to dismiss the grievance.

The Alberta Court of Appeal's finding that an employer need not have actual knowledge of an employee's disability before being obligated to accommodate the employee initially appears to be supported by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v British Columbia (Education).  However, the Moore test for prima facie discrimination does not stand in isolation. One must still consider the test in Meiorin, and other earlier human rights decisions, such as Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud.  In the latter case, the SCC commented on the duty on a complainant, whether in a case of direct or adverse effect discrimination.  At p. 994, the Court stated:

The search for accommodation is a multi-party inquiry.  Along with the employer and the union, there is also a duty on the complainant to assist in securing an appropriate accommodation.  The inclusion of the complainant in the search for accommodation was recognized by this Court in O'Malley.  At page 555, McIntyre J. stated:

Where such reasonable steps, however, do not fully reach the desired end, the complainant, in the absence of some accommodating steps on his own part such as an acceptance in this case of part-time work, must either sacrifice his religious principles or his employment.

To facilitate the search for an accommodation, the complainant must do his or her part as well.  Concomitant with a search for reasonable accommodation is a duty to facilitate the search for such an accommodation.  Thus in determining whether the duty of accommodation has been fulfilled the conduct of the complainant must be considered.

Clearly, unless an employee explicitly draws the employer's attention to the need for accommodation (or even the fact of disability), there cannot be an obligation on the employer to take steps to accommodate the employee.  The employer's knowledge, therefore, is an element of the analysis (albeit not at the stage of establishing prima facie discrimination).

The result in the Telus case does line up with the outcomes in Bish and Huffman, but how the Court got there may have created unnecessary confusion in the law.  By suggesting that an employer's knowledge is not a necessary element of the discrimination and accommodation analysis, the Court may lead employers and HR professionals to believe that they need to ferret out any and all potential disability claims before they surface as human rights complaints.  The law does not go that far.  Employees still have an individual responsibility to be frank about the need for accommodation and to participate in the process.  That has been the law for over 20 years, and the decision in Telus doesn't change that.

Do you have questions about human rights issues or the scope of the employer's duty to accommodate?  Contact Lance Ceaser for expert advice and guidance.